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HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTES: SHIELD OR SWORD*
HABITUAL criminal statutes, designed both to discourage chronic
criminality and to safeguard society against incorrigibles,1 have been
widely enacted during the past 75 or so years. Aside from a few early
cases in which their constitutionality was explored and affirmed 2 these
statutes have received little more than perfunctory judicial attention.
However, a novel and noteworthy construction has recently been
placed on New Jersey's habitual criminal statute4 in State v. McCall.5
The defendant, who was convicted of breaking and entering, had, on
two previous occasions, been convicted of burglary on three and four
separate counts respectively. The prosecutor then demanded that the
defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment, the penalty exacted by
the New Jersey habitual criminal statute of persons who have been
* State v. McCall, 99 A.zd 153 (N.J. Super. 5953).
1 For a discussion of the purposes and philosophy underlying habitual criminal
statutes see 58 A.L.R. 20 (.929).
'Graham v. West Virginia, 224. U.S. 616 (i912) (not a denial of life or liberty
without due process of law); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673 (1895) (not a denial
of equal protection of the laws) ; People v. Mock Don Yeun, 67 Cal. App. 597) 227
Pac. 948 (i924.) (not a delegation of legislative authority to the prosecutor) ; Kelly
v. People, 115 II. 583, 4 N.E. 644- (x886) (does not impose a penalty not propor-
tioned to the nature of the offense); Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 158 Mass. 598,
33 N.E. 648 (.893) (does not impose an unjust discrimination) ; People v. Morris,
8o Mich. 634, 45 N.W. 591 (189o) (does not impose cruel and unusual punishment) ;
People ex rel. Willis, ii App. Div. 4, 42 N.Y. Supp. 251 (1896) (does not impose
double jeopardy). See also Note, 58 A.L.R. 2o (1929).
' The more recent cases which have involved habitual criminal statutes have dealt
largely with statutory construction, effects of pardons and suspended sentences, insuf-
ficient indictments, pleadings and presumptions. These cases are collected in Note, 24
A.L.R.2d 1247 (1952).
'N.J.S.A. 2A:8 5 -12 (195i): "Any person convicted on three separate occasions
of high misdemeanors in this state, or of crimes under the laws of the United States
or any other state or country, which crimes would be high misdemeanors under the
laws of this state, or whose convictions for such offenses in this state or under the
laws of the United States or any other state or country shall total 3 or more, and
who thereafter is convicted of an offense enumerated in this subtitle, is hereby declared
to be an habitual criminal, and the court in which fourth or subsequent conviction
is had shall impose a life sentence in the state prison upon the person so convicted.
"Conviction of 2 or more of such crimes or high misdemeanors charged in one
indictment or accusation, or in two or more indictments or accusations consolidated
for trial shall be deemed to be only i conviction2'
599 A.2d 153 (N.J. Super. 1953).
NOTES
convicted of high misdemeanors6 on four "separate occasions."17 Ruling
that the statute was properly invoked, the trial court acceded to this
demand.
The sentence was affirmed by the intermediate appellate court de-
spite the defendant's contention that the statute was inapplicable since:
(i) he had not been convicted on at least four "separate occasions" as
was expressly required; and (2) even if he had been so convicted, he
had not been incarcerated following these prior convictions as was
implicitly required.
That the court erred in holding that conviction on each of several
counts in the same trial constituted conviction on a "separate occasion"
dearly appears from the statute itself.' However, even if the statute
had not expressly defined conviction on a separate occasion, this holding
would still be against the weight of authority that two or more con-
victions on the same day cannot be counted individually within the
meaning of the habitual criminal statutes.9
In an analogous case arising in the state of Washington, 0 the
defendant was convicted on three informations on the same day. These
being construed as individual convictions, he was then sentenced in
accordance with the provisions of the state's habitual criminal statute.1
On appeal from this sentence the court, unaided as was the New Jersey
court by a statutory provision containing the words "separate occasions,"
nevertheless reversed, holding that convictions on separate occasions
were necessarily implied by the statute.
It would appear also that the court erred in failing to recognize
that in order to be classified as an habitual criminal one must have
been incarcerated following his prior convictions. New Jersey's first
habitual criminal statute, enacted in 1898,12 was directed at second of-
fenders exclusively. Its critical language was: "Any offender who
'In New Jersey criminal practice a "high misdemeanor" is tantamount to felony
at common law. E.g., burglary, N.J.S.A. 2A: 94 -i 0953) , and rape, N.J.S.A.
2A:x3 8-1 (953), are denominated as "high misdemeanors" in the New Jersey statutes.
7See text of statute, supra note 4.
a Supra note 4.
'Biddle v. Thiele, xi F.2d 235 (1926)5 Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 8o6, 3o So.zd
304 (1947) ; People v. Klemick, 3i Ill. App. 5o8, 36 N.E.2d 846 (194x) ; People v.
Podsiad, 295 Mich. 54, 295 N.W. 257 (1940); State v. McKenzie, 182 Minn. 513,
235 N.W. 274 (93) ; Keib v. Mardany, 51 N.Y.S.2d 290 ('944.); Ryan v. Ny-
gaard, 70 N.D. 687, 297 N.W. 694 (94) 5 Cary v. State, 70 Ohio St. 121, 7o N.E.
955 (x9o4)5 Commonwealth ex rel. Turpack v. Ashe, 339 Pa. 403, 15 A.2d 359
(1940), Commonwealth v. Welsh, 2 Va. Cas. 57 (2827); Faull v. State, 178 Wis.
66, 289 N.W. 274 (1922).
10State v. Jones, x38 Wash. 110, 244. Pac. 395 (1926).
1"WASH. REM. COMP. STAT. § 2286 (1922).
"N.J. Laws 1898, c. 235, § 219.
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shall have been sentenced to imprisonment. .. ." (emphasis added).
Thus, in order for an offender to be brought within its purview he
must only have previously been sentenced to imprisonment. Reenact-
ments of the statute in 192713 and 193714 modified the 1898 Act by
providing for discretionary life imprisonment of those persons who
had been convicted of and sentenced to imprisonment for at least three
prior high misdemeanors, and by adding the further prerequisite that
each sentence must have been served. The 194o reenactment'6 of
the statute made life imprisonment mandatory for so-called "four
time losers." The 1951 reenactment 6 added the requirement that
prior convictions must have been on "separate occasions" but omitted
the express prerequisite that sentences on prior convictions must have
been served. It was on the basis of this omission that the court held
that the corrective influence of imprisonment was not an integral ele-
ment of "conviction" under the habitual criminal statute.
This inexplicable omission by the legislature, however, can only
have been inadvertent. A basic justification of the heavier penalties
imposed on incorrigibles under an habitual criminal statute is their
demonstrated imperviousness to the corrective influence of previous
imprisonments.'" Accordingly, to invoke such a statute to penalize a
recidivist for failure to respond to rehabilitative efforts to which he
has never been exposed extends its operation beyond the logical limits
of its principle. Yet, this is, in effect, the anomalous result which the
New Jersey court has reached.
Through unawareness or purposeful distortion of the unambiguous
statutory language, 18 or through disregard or ignorance of its under-
lying policy,'9 the court in this case has perverted and made a mockery
of the letter and the spirit of the New Jersey habitual criminal statute.
SANFORD HALBERSTADTER
"
1 N.J. Laws 1927, C. 218, §§ 1, 2; C. 263, §§ 1, 2.
"
4N.J. Laws 1937, 7: 136-4.
"R.S. 2:Io3-1o, as amended, N.J. Laws 1940, C. z19, p. 889, § 3, N.J.S.A.
"
6 Supra note 4-
"
7People v. Rose, 20 Cal. App. 2d 513, 79 P.2d 737 (-938).
"The construction urged by. the defendant had been unequivocally adopted by the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Meinkin, 1o N.J. 348, 91 A.zd 721 (95z).
" It has been repeatedly held that the opportunity for rehabilitation is an integral
part of the philosophy behind the habitual criminal statutes. Morgan v. Common-
wealth, 17o Ky. 400, 186 S.W. 132 (1916); Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Gratt 738
(Va. 1852) ; State ex rel. Stover v. Riffe, xz8 W. Va. 70, 35 S.E.2d 689 (194).
Contra: State v. Dale, iio Iowa zS, 81 N.W. 453 (900).
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